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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
An Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) is a security that tracks a basket of stocks. An ETF investor 
gains immediate exposure to the basket, by taking either a long or short position on this 
instrument. Both hedgers and speculators can short ETFs, making the informational content of 
increases in ETF short interest difficult to interpret. Using high frequency (daily) short interest 
data for ETFs traded on the London Stock Exchange between June 2006 and April 2010, we 
examine the price impact on ETFs of increases in short interest. Contrary to the received 
wisdom for individual stocks, we report evidence that large increases in ETF short interest are 
associated with subsequent over-performance relative to a benchmark index.     
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1. Introduction 
An interesting yet unexplored empirical question for short sellers, academics, and 
regulators is whether short selling in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) leads to 
predictable changes in ETF prices. An ETF is a security that tracks a basket of stocks, 
an index, or a fund. Traditionally, an increase in the short interest in a stock is viewed 
as a signal that the stock price is likely to fall, if market participants believe short sellers 
possess private information. In general, a short sale is costlier to execute than a long 
sale, owing to the need to cover the borrowing costs. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) 
suggest only those investors with strong expectations of a significant price decline will 
choose to short. Accordingly, significant increases in short interest should be followed 
by negative abnormal returns.  
 
On the contrary, Gastineau (2004) argues that short selling of ETFs may be tax-related, 
and therefore lacking in informational content. Gastineau (2008) develops the argument 
that a large increase in short interest does not necessarily indicate that short sellers 
expect an ETF portfolio to under-perform other ETFs in the same sector. To our 
knowledge this intuition has not previously been subject to empirical scrutiny, perhaps 
due to the lack of suitable ETF short interest data as well as the opaqueness of ETF data 
in general. This study is the first to investigate empirically the association between an 
increase in ETF short interest and the subsequent performance of ETFs. Using high-
frequency (daily) ETF short interest data, we sort increases in ETF short interest based 
on shares on loan and the short interest ratio into deciles. For both measures, the most 
(least) heavily shorted deciles yield the highest (lowest) Jensen’s alpha .1 
 
Our results offer insights into ETF shorting, which differ from the received wisdom 
concerning individual stock shorting. For individual stocks, the literature suggests the 
higher the level of short interest, the larger is the negative abnormal return (Figlewski, 
1981; Senchack and Starks, 1993; Choie and Hwang, 1994; Asquith and Meulbroek, 
1995; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002; Asquith, Pathak, and 
Ritter, 2005). For ETF, our results suggest that the larger the increase in short interest, 
the larger is Jensen’s alpha. We interpret this as evidence that hedgers, rather than 
                                                 
1 The ETF short interest ratio is the percentage of available lendable ETFs sold short. 
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speculators, dominate the market for the short selling of ETFs in the UK. Hedgers take 
short positions because they are bullish and want to protect their portfolios, while 
speculators do so because they are bearish and want to profit from their expectations. 
This interpretation points to an executable trading opportunity, involving taking a long 
position in ETFs in response to signals of large increases in short interest. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
description of the characteristics of ETFs listed on the London Stock Exchange, and 
lending fees. Section 3 reviews the literature on the informational content of short 
interest. Section 4 describes our data and research methodology. Section 5 reports our 
main results and a robustness check. Finally Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Exchange Traded Funds and Lending Fees 
Exchange Traded Funds are a variant of open-ended funds, listed and traded on 
exchanges in the same way as ordinary shares. Most ETFs track a basket of stocks or 
an index. Unlike normal open-ended funds, ETFs are traded continuously on an 
exchange, meaning they can be purchased, sold, and even shorted at any time during 
market trading hours. The distinctive advantage of ETFs is that they allow investors to 
gain exposure to a diverse range of assets, offering simple and efficient access to broad 
and sector indices. By going long or short on ETFs, investors can effectively gain access 
to a basket of stocks or an entire index, without engaging in the cumbersome process 
of investing in each of the constituent stocks. This feature makes ETFs a highly efficient 
investment tool. Hedgers may wish to short ETFs for portfolio insurance purposes, 
obtaining protection against market risk. Speculators may wish to short ETFs, if they 
hold a bearish view of ETF prices.  
 
The first ETF was listed on the London Stock Exchange Main Market in April 2000. 
This was followed by a steady growth in the number of funds listed. In January 2002, 
the value of ETFs traded during the month was only £6 million. By January 2003 this 
value had risen to £172 million, and in January 2006 the value of ETFs traded was £799 
million (Chelley-Steeley and Park, 2011). In February 2007, stamp duty for foreign 
domiciled ETFs was abolished. As a consequence the number of ETFs listed on the 
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London Stock Exchange increased by 146 percent on the 2006 figure; the monthly value 
traded increased by 103 percent; and the number of trades increased by 88 percent.2  
 
In the UK, all ETF contracts are cleared through a central counterparty, Euroclear UK 
and Ireland. As the UK’s central securities depository, Euroclear provides custodian 
services and operates the securities settlement system for almost all UK securities and 
at least 83 percent3 of UK unit trust funds, including ETFs. Euroclear has published 
monthly and daily stock lending data since September 2003. In order to short an ETF, 
the seller must locate and borrow the ETF. Stock lending data on ETFs can be 
interpreted as a good proxy for the outstanding level of short interest in ETFs. The 
annual loan premium can range from nearly 10bp (basis points) in a very low interest 
rate environment, to a maximum of around 30bp if management recapture is built into 
the loan premium. If the loan premium rises above 30bp, ETF short sellers are likely to 
switch into futures contracts, and some ETF investors may create ETF shares to lend 
(Gastineau, 2004). 
 
3. Related Literature 
The extant literature provides three different perspectives on the expected relationship 
between short interest and stock returns. First, Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) develop 
a model based on a rational expectations framework, and derive a negative association 
between short interest and subsequent stock returns. When short selling is restricted, 
either directly or through the imposition of additional costs, uninformed traders tend to 
be driven out of the pool of shorts, and informational efficiency may be improved. Only 
well-informed traders with strong expectations of a price decline will choose to bear 
the cost of shorting stocks. Unexpected or unusually large increases in short interest 
tend to signal poor subsequent stock returns. 
 
This perspective is supported by several empirical studies. Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and 
Swan (1998) find short sellers tend to use market orders to execute selling orders; this 
suggests they are informed traders. Asquith and Meulbroek (1995), Desai et al. (2002), 
and Asquith et al. (2005) find high levels of short interest in stocks are bearish signals 
                                                 
2 See http://www.londonstockexchange.com/specialist-issuers/etfs/etfs.htm 
3 See Euroclear UK and Ireland Market Performance Statistics for October 2011. 
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of a negative relationship between the level of short interest and stock returns. Senchack 
and Starks (1993) and Choie and Hwang (1994) identify a negative association between 
changes in short interest and stock returns, in accordance with Diamond and 
Verrecchia’s hypothesis. Choie and Hwang’s (1994) find large increases in short 
interest provide a more informative signal than the level of short interest about short 
selling returns. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) find heavily shorted stocks on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) significantly under-perform lightly shorted stocks 
over 20 trading days. Institutional non-program shorts are the most informative. Diether, 
Lee, and Werner (2009) find that portfolios of long, lightly shorted stocks and short, 
heavily shorted stocks yield positive abnormal returns over five trading days. 
 
The second perspective, widely shared by technical traders and analysts and sometimes 
known as the ‘Wall Street view’, suggests a positive relationship between a high level 
of short interest and stock returns. A high level of short interest reflects a latent demand 
for shorted stocks. Short positions need to be covered eventually, resulting in future 
purchases that will place upward pressure on prices. A high level of short interest is a 
bullish signal (Epstein, 1995). Proponents suggest, from a contrarian viewpoint, that 
institutional investors do not sell short, so a high level of short interest reflects 
misguided pessimism on the part of the public and traders.4 If the investing public and 
traders are wrong more often than they are right, a high level of short interest is a bullish 
(buying) signal (Biggs, 1966; Fosback, 1995). Despite its popularity among 
practitioners, the Wall Street view is not supported by most of the previous empirical 
evidence. The only study which supports this conjecture is documented by Au, Doukas 
and Onayev (2009).  Using UK dataset, they show highly shorted stocks exhibit positive 
albeit statistically insignificant abnormal returns.  
 
A third and final perspective suggests no association between a high level of short 
interest and stock returns. According to Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990), the increasing 
trend in short interest in the US from 1974 to 1985 relates mostly to hedging and 
arbitrage. Short interest is uninformative if it is driven by arbitrage. Using monthly 
                                                 
4 Biggs (1966) quotes Joseph Granville’s trading rule “If the short interest is rising it means people are 
growing bearish on the issue. The further short interest rises, the more bearish is the public opinion on 
the stock. The market cannot accommodate that many people as being right and thus the stock is destined 
to advance. A rising short interest is bullish, the longer it rises, the more bullish it is.” 
7 
 
short interest data for stocks listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ for the period 1986-91, 
Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) conclude that short sellers do not possess superior 
timing skills on average, and do not generate unfair profits by driving prices down. 
They provide liquidity, however, by shorting into up markets and reducing short 
positions in down markets. Using a long-horizon weekly UK dataset for 2003-06, Au, 
Doukas, and Onayev (2009) find no significant relationship between a high level of 
short interest (proxied by stock lending) and stock returns. Using short interest as a 
selling signal may not be optimal. Short selling is dominated by arbitrage, and lacks 
informational content. 
 
As noted above, we are unaware of any previous empirical evidence on the price impact 
of ETF short selling. Given that the first perspective is dominant both analytically and 
empirically, our prior hypothesis is that large increases in short interest in ETFs are 
associated with subsequent negative ETF returns. 
 
4. Research Methodology 
Daily data for shares on loan, the short interest measure used in this study, are obtained 
from Euroclear UK and Ireland for all 86 ETFs traded on the London Stock Exchange 
during the period June 2006 - April 2010. These ETFs are listed and described briefly 
in Table 1. Most ETFs traded on the London Stock Exchange during the period were 
equity funds, but there were some debt, real estate, and commodity funds. The ETF 
descriptions and daily closing prices are compiled from Bloomberg and Datastream. 
The data set contains 20,912 daily observations of changes in ETF shares on loan. 
 
< Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the growing importance of ETF shorting. Three alternative measures, 
the aggregate quantity of shorted ETFs, the aggregate supply of ETFs in Euroclear, and 
the median of the short interest ratio (short interest as a percentage of the available 
supply of ETFs) reflect an upward trend in the aggregate supply of ETFs over the 
observation period. Shorting, however, appears to become less prevalent, both in terms 
of aggregate volume and as a percentage of the available supply, towards the end of 
this period. 
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<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the sample by ETF type and year of inception. In 
Panel A, the majority of ETF shorts are for equity ETFs (N = 2666), followed by debt 
(298), real estate (72) and commodity (4). In Panel B, the most frequent year of 
inception is 2005 (903), followed by 2004 (687) and 2000 (409). The number of ETFs 
has declined sharply since 2008, plausibly as a consequence of the financial crisis.  
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
In the US, ETF short interest data are not publicly available. However, a weekly 
summary can be requested from the American Stock Exchange, and institutional 
ownership as a proxy for supply of shortable ETF shares can be retrieved via 13-F 
filings and similar quarterly filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Gastineau, 2004). This institutional constraint precludes study of the informational 
content of ETF short interest in the US. In the UK, by contrast, Euroclear publishes 
daily ETF share lending positions after a delay of three trading days. Data relating to 
lending positions on Monday, for example, are available on Thursday. Accordingly, it 
is feasible to investigate the impact on prices of changes in ETF short interest. We test 
whether a trading strategy of shorting ETFs following an increase in short interest can 
yield abnormal profits.  
 
In the UK, the most common motive for borrowing securities is to cover a short sale, 
with the short seller borrowing the securities to be delivered to the buyer on settlement. 
With reference to covered short sales, an ETF is deemed to have been shorted if and 
only if there is an increase in shares on loan. Two alternative measures of ETF short 
interest are employed: (i) increase in the natural logarithm of ETF shares on loan; and 
(ii) increase in the ETF short interest ratio, where the short interest ratio is the number 
of ETF shares on loan divided by the number of ETFs shares to be loaned through 
Euroclear. The latter measure is subject to the difficulty that an increase in the short 
interest ratio might be driven by a decrease in the denominator (shares available for 
loan). Accordingly, for an ETF to be deemed to have experienced an increase in short 
interest, it must experience an increase in shares on loan. We exclude daily observations 
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for which the increase in short interest is zero or negative, yielding a sample of positive 
increases in short interest in ETFs of 3,040 daily observations.  
 
For each measure we sort the sample into portfolios based on increase-in-short-interest 
deciles: the portfolio for increase-in-short-interest decile 1 contains the daily 
observations on an ETF for 30 days after an increase in short interest assigned to the 
smallest decile; and the portfolio for increase-in-short-interest decile 10 contains the 
daily observations on an ETF for 30 days after an increase in short interest assigned to 
the largest decile. Let t,is denote the increase in short interest for ETF i between day 
t–1 and day t. As noted above, daily changes in the short-interest ratio are observed for 
86 ETFs over 30 trading days between June 2006 and April 2010. We observe 0s t,i   
for 3,040 out of 20,912 daily observations. The 3,040 positive values of t,is are sorted 
into 10 increase-in-short-interest deciles. We write {i, t} j to denote ETF-trading day 
observations for which the positive observed value of t,is  belongs to decile j, for 
j=1,...,10. Descriptive statistics for each short interest measure and each increase-in-
short-interest decile are reported in Table 2.  
 
< Insert Table 2 here> 
 
In order to compare the performance of portfolios defined with reference to the ETF 
increase-in-short-interest deciles, we adopt the Jensen (1968) alpha approach. In the 
market model, a positive alpha (intercept coefficient) indicates over-performance, and 
negative alpha indicates under-performance, relative to a benchmark index. The market 
model specification is as follows: 
 
  t,it,ft,mjjt,ft,i )rr(
ˆˆrr  
 
 
where ri,t+ is the daily (calendar time) logarithmic return for ETF i on day t+ for 
=1,…,30 following an observed increase in short interest observed for ETF i on day t; 
rm,t+ is the daily logarithmic return on an appropriate benchmark index on day t+; and 
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rf,t+ is the risk-free rate proxied by the UK Treasury Bill rate on day t+.5 The intercept, 
jˆ (Jensen’s alpha) measures the average abnormal daily return with respect to the 
benchmark. jˆ  is estimated using the data from day t+1 to day t+30 following an 
increase in shares on loan or short interest ratio for ETF i on day t, over all {i, t} j. 
 
We use the following benchmark indices: MSCI ACWI (All Countries Weighted Index) 
IMI (Investable Market Indices) Value Weighted Price Index for equity ETF; iBoxx 
Euro Corporates Overall Price Index for debt ETF; MSCI ACWI (All Countries 
Weighted Index) Real Estate Price Index for real estate ETF; and MSCI Commodity 
Producers Sector Capped Price for commodity ETF.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
To investigate the price impact on ETFs following an increase in short interest, Table 
3 reports the estimated values of Jensen’s alpha, the risk-adjusted performance measure, 
for each of the two sets of portfolios comprising ETFs sorted into increase-in-short-
interest deciles. For both measures, we find no evidence of under-performance for 
heavily shorted ETFs in decile 10, and no evidence of over-performance for lightly 
shorted ETFs in decile 1. Indeed, the results suggest the opposite: heavily (lightly) 
shorted ETFs yield the highest (lowest) abnormal returns. For example, Jensen’s alpha 
for decile 10 is 0.038% (increase in shares on loan measure) or 0.035% (increase in 
short interest ratio measure), and statistically significant in both cases. Assuming there 
are 240 trading days per year, this strategy translates into annualised risk-adjusted 
profits of 9.12% or 8.40%, respectively. For decile 1 the corresponding figures are 
0.012% and 0.002%, respectively, and neither of these is significant. Although the 
relationship is not monotonic, there is a clear tendency for the estimated alpha to 
increase with both short interest measures.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The observation period for the results reported in Table 3 coincides with the financial 
crisis of the late-2000s, as well as a UK ban on short selling, effective during the period 
                                                 
5 For example, on 3rd January 2007, where the annualized rate for the three-month UK Treasury-Bill 
was 5.0625%, the average daily return was 5.0625/365 = 0.0139%. 
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19th September 2008 to 16th January 2009. In order to investigate whether the 
relationship between short interest and performance might vary according to market 
trading conditions, Table 4 reports compares Jensen alphas for all deciles between pre 
and post (during?) financial crisis period. The cut-off date in partitioning our sample is 
19th September 2008 which coincides with the start of the short selling ban. Our results 
show during the period prior to financial crisis, heavily shorted ETFs yield the highest 
abnormal returns using the first measure (increase in shares on loan), but no clear 
pattern using the second measure (increase in short interest ratio). Both measures show 
abnormal returns are the highest and statistically significant in heavily shorted deciles 
during and after the short selling ban period.  
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
In Table 5 below, we compare the abnormal returns for all deciles according to the ages 
of ETFs. In so doing, we partition our sample based on the median of ETF years (5 
years), and classify the age of ETFs between 0 and 5 years as ‘young’ and more than 5 
years as ‘old’. In the case of ‘young’ ETFs, the result is broadly consistent with that of 
the full sample. That is, for both measures, heavily shorted ETFs earn the highest 
abnormal performance and vice-versa for lightly shorted ETFs. For instance, the highest 
Jensen alpha using the first measure (increase in shares on loan) is in decile 10 (0.043%), 
and using the second measure (increase in short interest ratio) is in decile 9 (0.044%) 
followed by decile 10 (0.041%), and statistically significant in all cases. However, the 
abnormal returns are not statistically significant with to ‘old’ ETFs and there is no clear 
trend across different deciles. Our results appear to suggest that abnormal returns 
mainly stem from ETFs which are relatively new in the market.         
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
 
Our prior hypothesis, that large increases in ETF short interest are associated with 
negative abnormal returns, is not supported by the data. Instead the results suggest that 
heavily shorted ETFs are likely to over-perform. This is generally consistent with 
empirical findings of Au et al., (2009), and the Wall Street view. It is plausible that a 
high degree of short interest is a sign of a latent demand for shorted ETFs. Short 
12 
 
positions need to be covered ultimately, resulting in future purchases that will place 
increasing pressure on prices.  This could also reflect the fact that the market is 
dominated by hedgers. Hedgers who expect an increase in the value of the stock market 
index, or of a particular ETF, may short ETFs heavily so as to attain their desired hedge 
ratio and protect their portfolios against market risk. The goal of hedgers is not to 
speculate, but rather to create a balanced portfolio of long and short positions that offers 
a relatively low variance. Light shortings of ETFs, indicated by small increases in short 
interest, are likely to be undertaken by other traders, for reasons other than hedging. 
High increases in ETF short interest decile portfolios significantly overperform the 
market as compared to low increases decile portfolios.  
 
As a robustness check, we apply the methodology used by Harper, Madura, and 
Schnusenberg (2006), as an alternative method for assessing the association between 
an increase in ETF short interest and subsequent ETF performance. We calculate 
cumulative average returns over a 35-day window before and after an increase in short 
interest (measured by the short interest ratio), for portfolios based on increase-in-short-
interest deciles, constructed in the same way as before. In applying this methodology, 
we assume there is no tracking error between the ETFs and the underlying index.  
 
Using the same notation as before, we let 









s
5
t,i
j}t,i{
js,j r)n/1(CAR  denote the 
cumulative average return from trading day t–5 to trading day t+s (for s=–5,...,30) 
before or after day t when a positive value of t,is  is observed for ETF i, calculated 
over the nj ETF-trading day observations for which {i, t} j. Figure 3 plots CARj,s for 
the increase-in-short-interest deciles j=1,…,10 over the event window (s = t–5, …, 
t+30). The results show that heavily shorted ETFs yield positive cumulative average 
returns, whereas lightly shorted ETFs yield negative cumulative average returns. The 
results of this exercise are consistent with the main results reported in section 5. The 
larger (smaller) the increase in ETF short interest, the larger (smaller) is the subsequent 
average return.  
 
6.   Conclusion 
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In this paper, we examine the association between increases in short interest and the 
subsequent performance of ETFs listed on the London Stock Exchange. As far as we 
are aware, this paper is the first to study the price effects of increases in short interest 
in ETFs. Tracking errors aside, shorting an ETF is similar to shorting an index. From 
both the practitioner and academic perspectives, the price impact is interesting to study, 
because more than one type of investor may be involved in the short selling of ETFs. 
Since different types of trader may have different motives for short selling, the signals 
are not easy to interpret. Accordingly, short selling of ETFs may be viewed as a high-
risk financial activity. 
 
Using two measures of ETF short interest, we create ten ETF portfolios defined on the 
basis of the magnitude of the increase in short interest. We estimate Jensen’s alpha for 
each portfolio over a 30-day window following any observed increase in short interest. 
The pattern is the reverse of that reported in most previous studies of the association 
between increases in short interest in individual stocks and their subsequent 
performance, which indicate under-performance following large increases in short 
interest (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Choie and Hwang, 1994). We report evidence that 
ETFs tend to over-perform following large increases in short interest.  
 
We interpret our findings as indicative that the short selling of ETFs is dominated by 
traders implementing hedging strategies. Hedgers take short positions because they are 
bullish, while speculators do so because they are bearish. Interestingly, this 
interpretation of the results points to an executable contrarian trading opportunity. It 
appears that when ETFs are being heavily shorted, indicated by large increases in ETF 
short interest, investors can trade profitably by taking a long position in ETFs. Our 
evidence provides new insights on how to interpret large increases in short interest.  
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Table 1. ETF Data Samples 
 
Note: This table contains the tickers, names, types and date of inception of funds of all Exchange Traded 
Funds samples traded on the London Stock Exchange during the study period June 2006 through April 
2010. 
 
  
Ticker ETF Name Type Inception Ticker ETF Name Type Inception
SGLD Source Physical Mkt Plc Ltd Co Commodity 30/06/2009 IEER Ishares Msci Eastern Europe Equity 16/12/2005
WOOD Ishares S&P Timber Commodity 12/10/2007 IEMI Ishares S&P Emerging Equity 15/02/2008
EEX5 Ishares Barclays Euro Corp Bond Debt 25/09/2009 IEUR Ishares Ftseurofirst 80 Equity 20/12/2000
EEXF Ishares Barclays Euro Corp Bond Debt 25/09/2009 IEUT Ishares Ftse Eurofirst Equity 23/10/2001
IBCI Ishares Euro Inflation Debt 19/12/2005 IEUX Ishares Msci Europe Equity 05/06/2006
IBCX Ishares Euro Corp Debt 07/05/2003 IFFF Ishares Msci Ac Far East Equity 07/12/2005
IBGE Ishares Barclays Euro T- Bond Debt 06/03/2009 IH2O Ishares S&P Global Water Equity 19/03/2007
IBGL Ishares Euro Govt Bond 15-30 Debt 08/12/2006 IJPN Ishares Msci Japan Shares Equity 04/10/2004
IBGM Ishares Euro Govt Bond 7-10 Debt 11/12/2006 IKOR Ishares Msci Korea Equity 19/12/2005
IBGS Ishares Eur Govt Debt 02/06/2006 IMEU Ishares Msci Europe Equity 06/07/2007
IBGX Ishares Euro Govt Bond 3-5 Debt 08/12/2006 IMIB Ishares Ftse Mib Equity 06/07/2007
IBTM Ishares $ T- Bond 7-10 Debt 08/12/2006 INFR Ishares Ftse/Macquarie Equity 20/10/2006
IBTS Ishares $ T- Bond Debt 02/06/2006 INRG Ishares Global Clean Energy Equity 06/07/2007
IEBC Ishares Barclays Euro Corp Bond £ Debt 06/03/2009 IPRP Ishares Ftse/Epra Euro Equity 19/12/2005
IEGA Ishares Barclays Euro T- Bond £ Debt 20/04/2009 IPRV Ishares S&P Listed Private Equity 19/03/2007
IEGY Ishares Barclays Euro Govt Bond Debt 16/04/2009 IPXJ Ishares Msci Pacific Equity 17/04/2009
IEMB Ishares Jpmorgan Usd Debt 15/02/2008 ISEM Ishares Msci Emerging Mkt Equity 07/12/2007
IGLS Ishares Ftse Uk Gilts Debt 17/04/2009 ISF Ishares Ftse 100 Equity 19/05/2000
IGLT Ishares Ftse Uk All Debt 01/12/2006 ISFE Ishares Ii Plc Ltd Co Equity 12/05/2008
INXG Etf Ishares £ Idx Lkd Debt 01/12/2006 ISJP Ishares Iii Plc Ltd Co Equity 12/05/2008
ITPS Ishares $ Tips Debt 08/12/2006 ISP6 Ishares Iii Plc Ltd Co Equity 12/05/2008
LQDE Ishares Usd Coporate Bond Debt 20/05/2003 ISUS Ishares Msci Usa Islamic Equity 07/12/2007
SCOV Ishares Iii Plc Ltd Co Debt 01/08/2008 ISWD Ishares Msci World Islamic Equity 07/12/2007
SE15 Ishares Barclays Euro Corp Debt 25/09/2009 ITKY Ishares Msci Turkey Equity 03/11/2006
SGIL Ishares Iii Plc Ltd Co Debt 01/08/2008 ITWN Ishares Msci Taiwan Index Equity 19/12/2005
SGLO Ishares Citigroup Global Govt Debt 06/03/2009 IUKD Ishares Ftse Uk Dividend Plus Equity 16/12/2005
SLXX Ishares Plc Ltd Co Debt 01/09/2004 IUSA Ishares S&P 500 Equity 19/03/2002
ALTE Etfx Daxglobal Alternative Energy Equity 07/10/2008 IWDP Ishares Ftse Epra/Nareit Equity 20/10/2006
BRIC European Etf Ishares Equity 20/04/2007 IWRD Ishares Msci World Equity 19/12/2005
DJMC Ishares Dj Euro Stoxx Equity 19/12/2005 IWXU Ishares Ftse Developed Equity 17/04/2009
DJSC Ishares Dj Euro Stoxx Equity 19/12/2005 IXMU Ishares Msci Europe Ex-Emu £ Equity 17/04/2009
EQQQ Nasdaq 100 European Equity 13/12/2004 LTAM Ishares Msci Latin America Equity 12/10/2007
EUE Ishares Dj Eurostoxx 50 Equity 11/10/2001 MIDD Ishares Ftse 250 Equity 19/05/2004
EUN Ishares Dj Stoxx 50 Equity 11/10/2001 S250 Source Mkt Ftse 250 Source Equity 20/04/2009
IAEX Ishares Aex Equity 16/12/2005 SACC Ishares S&P 500 (Acc) Equity 25/09/2009
IAPD Ishares Dj Asia/Pacific Equity 02/06/2006 SCAN Ishares Msci Canada Equity 22/01/2010
IBZL Ishares Msci Brazil Equity 19/12/2005 SEMA Ishares Msci Emerging Mkt (Acc) Equity 25/09/2009
IDFX Ishares Plc Ltd Co Equity 26/10/2004 SEMS Ishares Msci Emerging Mkt Equity 06/03/2009
IDJG Ishares Dj Euro Stoxx Equity 16/12/2005 SMEA Ishares Msci Europe (Acc)Plc Equity 25/09/2009
IDJV Ishares Dj Eurostoxx Equity 20/12/2005 XLKS Technology S&P Us Sel Equity 04/01/2010
IDNA Ishares Msci North America Equity 02/06/2006 IASP Ishares Ftse Epra/Nareit Real Estate 20/10/2006
IDVY Ishares Dj Eurostoxx Equity 16/12/2005 IUKP Ishares Ftse Epra/Nareit Real Estate 19/03/2007
IEEM Ishares Msci Emerging Mkt Equity 16/12/2005 IUSP Ishares Ftse Epra/Nareit Real Estate 03/11/2006
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Notes: An ETF is deemed to have been shorted if and only if there is an increase in shares on loan.  The 
degree of ETF shorting is measured in two ways: a) increase in ETF shares on loan; b) increase in ETF 
short interest ratio.  Panel A presents the summary statistics of increases in ETF shares on loan while 
Panel B shows the summary statistics of increases in ETF short interest ratio for each decile during the 
sample period June 2006 through April 2010. Decile 1 contains the lowest increases whereas Decile 10 
contains the highest increases in ETF shares on loan or short interest ratio. An increase in ETF shares on 
loan is natural log increase in shares on loan while an increase in short interest ratio is a simple arithmetic 
increase in the ETF short interest ratio from one day to the next. The short interest ratio is the percentage 
of available (lendable) supply of ETF shares being lent out.   
Panel A: Increase in ETF Shares on Loan Deciles (in %)
Decile N Mean Std Dev Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
1 304 0.210 0.133 0.004 0.089 0.205 0.324 0.460
2 304 0.782 0.186 0.460 0.625 0.782 0.939 1.114
3 304 1.609 0.297 1.116 1.351 1.617 1.870 2.126
4 304 3.005 0.576 2.126 2.510 2.956 3.479 4.056
5 304 5.415 0.828 4.058 4.727 5.382 6.104 6.943
6 304 8.987 1.298 6.958 7.836 8.924 10.016 11.388
7 304 14.414 2.115 11.393 12.516 14.054 15.948 18.734
8 304 25.142 4.296 18.734 21.309 24.521 28.936 33.492
9 304 47.036 8.646 33.566 39.148 47.014 53.650 64.602
10 304 139.972 91.840 64.756 81.798 109.308 162.521 863.070
Panel B: Increase in ETF Short Interest Ratio Deciles (in %)
Decile N Mean Std Dev Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
1 304 0.002 0.002 0.000004 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005
2 304 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.015
3 304 0.022 0.022 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.025 0.030
4 304 0.041 0.042 0.030 0.035 0.042 0.047 0.053
5 304 0.070 0.069 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.079 0.090
6 304 0.114 0.114 0.090 0.100 0.114 0.128 0.144
7 304 0.184 0.182 0.144 0.161 0.182 0.204 0.232
8 304 0.316 0.310 0.232 0.271 0.310 0.365 0.415
9 304 0.593 0.578 0.415 0.482 0.578 0.702 0.833
10 304 2.632 1.337 0.834 1.009 1.337 2.125 71.375
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 Table 3 Comparison of Jensen Alphas between Deciles  
 
 Notes: This table reports the alphas for all deciles; Panel A shows alphas for increases in shares on loan 
deciles while Panel B shows alphas for increases in short interest ratio deciles.  Decile 1 contains the 
lowest increases whereas Decile 10 contains the highest increases in ETF shares on loan or short interest 
ratio.  Alphas (0, +30) are measured using the Jensen alpha method: 
  t,it,ft,mjjt,ft,i )rr(
ˆˆrr  
  
Panel A: Increase in Shares on Loan Deciles
Decile N Alpha (%) Std Error (%) t-stat P-value Beta Std Error t-stat P-value
1 304 0.012 0.012 1.00 0.32 0.833 0.010 85.22 0.00
2 304 0.023 0.011 2.04 0.04 0.879 0.009 94.78 0.00
3 304 0.009 0.012 0.72 0.47 0.904 0.009 95.44 0.00
4 304 0.016 0.012 1.34 0.18 0.875 0.009 94.49 0.00
5 304 0.022 0.011 2.02 0.04 0.891 0.009 95.74 0.00
6 304 0.020 0.013 1.53 0.13 0.959 0.010 92.56 0.00
7 304 0.029 0.013 2.24 0.03 0.911 0.011 84.05 0.00
8 304 0.019 0.012 1.64 0.10 0.830 0.011 77.13 0.00
9 304 0.032 0.013 2.42 0.02 0.845 0.011 76.56 0.00
10 304 0.038 0.013 3.03 0.00 0.805 0.010 77.48 0.00
Panel B: Increase in Short Interest Ratio Deciles
Decile N Alpha (%) Std Error (%) t-stat P-value Beta Std Error t-stat P-value
1 304 0.002 0.013 0.18 0.86 0.800 0.010 82.36 0.00
2 304 0.019 0.013 1.45 0.15 0.853 0.010 81.41 0.00
3 304 0.006 0.013 0.45 0.66 0.879 0.010 84.21 0.00
4 304 0.018 0.012 1.49 0.14 0.858 0.010 88.46 0.00
5 304 0.024 0.012 1.94 0.05 0.899 0.010 90.57 0.00
6 304 0.025 0.013 2.03 0.04 0.922 0.011 83.85 0.00
7 304 0.032 0.012 2.65 0.01 0.898 0.010 93.74 0.00
8 304 0.026 0.012 2.19 0.03 0.929 0.009 100.45 0.00
9 304 0.034 0.012 2.89 0.00 0.828 0.010 85.56 0.00
10 304 0.035 0.012 2.98 0.00 0.903 0.011 82.33 0.00
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Table 4 Comparison of Jensen Alphas between Pre and Post Financial Crisis  
 
Notes: This table reports the alphas for all deciles and compares between pre and post financial crisis 
period. The cut-off date for financial crisis is 19th September 2008 which coincides with the start of short 
selling ban. Panel A shows alphas for increases in shares on loan deciles while Panel B shows alphas for 
increases in short interest ratio deciles.  Decile 1 contains the lowest increases whereas Decile 10 contains 
the highest increases in ETF shares on loan or short interest ratio.  Alphas (0, +30) are measured using 
the Jensen alpha method: 
  t,it,ft,mjjt,ft,i )rr(
ˆˆrr  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Increase in Shares on Loan Deciles
Pre Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis
Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat
1 119 0.018 0.84 1 185 0.039 2.79
2 124 0.034 1.67 2 180 0.033 2.45
3 116 -0.016 -0.86 3 183 0.034 2.02
4 121 0.015 0.81 4 183 0.033 2.39
5 121 0.002 0.10 5 184 0.017 1.11
6 120 0.034 1.86 6 182 0.039 2.26
7 121 0.055 2.42 7 187 0.032 2.18
8 119 0.001 0.05 8 186 0.026 1.79
9 119 0.023 1.18 9 187 0.045 2.91
10 120 0.064 2.61 10 183 0.030 1.97
Panel B: Increase in Short Interest Ratio Deciles
Pre Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis
Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat
1 121 0.019 0.82 1 184 0.014 0.94
2 121 0.015 0.66 2 185 0.032 2.02
3 119 -0.004 -0.22 3 184 0.016 1.00
4 119 0.042 2.20 4 185 0.013 0.88
5 119 0.017 0.83 5 183 0.031 2.02
6 121 0.026 1.36 6 184 0.047 3.06
7 121 0.039 2.10 7 184 0.036 2.36
8 121 0.032 1.62 8 185 0.038 2.51
9 121 0.021 1.05 9 182 0.047 3.14
10 117 0.018 0.94 10 184 0.051 3.78
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Table 5 Comparison of Jensen Alphas between Young and Old ETFs  
 
Notes: Notes: This table reports the alphas for all deciles and compares between young and old ETFs. 
The partition is based on the median of ETFs, i.e., 5 years. Panel A shows alphas for increases in shares 
on loan deciles while Panel B shows alphas for increases in short interest ratio deciles.  Decile 1 contains 
the lowest increases whereas Decile 10 contains the highest increases in ETF shares on loan or short 
interest ratio.  Alphas (0, +30) are measured using the Jensen alpha method: 
  t,it,ft,mjjt,ft,i )rr(
ˆˆrr  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Increase in Shares on Loan Deciles
Young ETFs Old ETFs
Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat
1 222 0.017 1.11 1 83 0.006 0.34
2 222 0.024 1.68 2 81 0.016 0.94
3 220 0.008 0.52 3 81 0.010 0.60
4 223 0.012 0.85 4 81 0.011 0.61
5 223 0.022 1.51 5 82 0.030 1.52
6 221 0.030 1.86 6 82 -0.006 -0.30
7 222 0.020 1.23 7 81 0.034 1.63
8 224 0.022 1.66 8 83 0.035 1.64
9 224 0.042 2.56 9 81 0.022 1.22
10 223 0.043 2.77 10 81 0.006 0.29
Panel B: Increase in Short Interest Ratio Deciles
Young ETFs Old ETFs
Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat Decile N Alpha (%) t-stat
1 222 0.017 1.03 1 83 -0.001 -0.06
2 223 0.002 0.09 2 81 0.004 0.20
3 222 0.013 0.84 3 82 0.010 0.51
4 223 0.012 0.83 4 82 0.019 1.00
5 222 0.039 2.53 5 81 0.020 1.01
6 221 0.019 1.23 6 81 0.007 0.37
7 222 0.028 1.89 7 82 0.026 1.38
8 223 0.027 1.88 8 81 0.035 1.84
9 223 0.044 3.17 9 83 0.012 0.60
10 223 0.041 2.79 10 80 0.021 1.30
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Figure 1. Time Series of Three Short Selling Measures for ETF Shares 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows market aggregate shorts, shortable supply, and median short interest ratio for 
ETF shares traded on the London Stock Exchange from June 2006 through April 2010. The short 
interest ratio is the percentage of available (lendable) supply of ETF shares sold short. The aggregate 
shortable (lendable) supply is the total number of ETF shares that can be borrowed and shorted. The 
aggregate shorts is the total number of ETF shares that has been borrowed and shorted by investors. 
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Figure 2.  ETF Shorts Samples by Type and Inception Year 
 
 
 
Notes: These figures report the distribution of the ETF shorts samples from June 2006 
through April 2010.  The total number of samples is 3040.  These samples are distributed 
by type and year of inception.  The benchmarks used are as follows: 
a) Equity ETF;  MSCI ACWI (All Countries Weighted Index) IMI (Investable 
Market Indices) Value Weighted Price Index 
b) Debt ETF; iBoxx Euro Corporates Overall Price Index 
c) Real Estate ETF; MSCI ACWI (All Countries Weighted Index) Real Estate Price 
Index 
d) Commodity ETF; MSCI Commodity Producers Sector Capped Price  
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Figure 3. Cumulative Average Returns for all ETF Deciles  
 
 
 
Notes: This figure presents the comparison of cumulative average returns from five trading days before 
through 30 trading days after between the ten deciles. Day0 is the day of occurrence of increases in 
ETF short interest. Day3 is the day when the short interest information on ETFs is released to the public. 
Increases in ETF short interest are sorted in deciles. Decile 1 contains the lowest increases, while decile 
10 contains the highest increases in ETF short interest. Cumulative average returns are cumulative 
values of daily logarithmic returns of ETFs for each decile. 
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